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bstract: This paper proposes an index of national levels of 
“intergenerational solidarity”, defined as “investments or 
sacrifices that are intended to increase or sustain the well­
being of future generations”.
This is measured by examining changes to the value and stability of 
various capital flows and stocks. Nine indicators are drawn from 
national­level statistics: forest degradation rate, share of low­carbon 
energy consumption, and carbon footprint in the environmental di­
mension; adjusted net savings, current account balance, and wealth 
in equality in the economic dimension; and primary pupil­teacher 
ratio, fertility rate, and GDP­adjusted child mortality in the social 
dimension.
This returns a comparative index score of intergenerational solidarity 
for 120 countries covering 92% of the world’s population. Through­
out, the state of the current research on intergenerational transfers and 
on the individual metrics used is discussed, and suggestions are made 
for further improvements and work in measuring intergenerational 
solidarity. 
As it stands, the index provides the widest coverage of indicators and 
nations aimed at measuring any similar concept. As such, it is par­
ticularly useful for those who wish to investigate the causes of inter­
generational solidarity through cross­cultural comparisons.
Keywords: Intergenerational, Index, Intertemporal, Discounting, 
Long­term
Editorial note: all supplementary material, consisting of descrip-
tive statistics (Appendix I), some indicators considered for inclu-
sion (Appendix II) and the full table of indicator and index scores 
(Appendix III) can be found on igjr.org.
Introduction1
“We act as we do because we can get away with it: future generations 
do not vote; they have no political or financial power; they cannot 
challenge our decisions.”  World Commission on Environment and 
Development (1987: 8)
For as long as societies have existed, we have saved, planned, 
bequeathed, and built for the future. As awareness has risen of 
the grievous long-term2 consequences of some of our collective 
choices, there has been increased interest in quantifying and un-
derstanding intergenerational solidarity3 (Oxford Martin Com-
mission 2013).
Fortunately, in the last decades we have gained the national sta-
tistics and computational power to do this work. If we can first 
quantify and then find causes for variations in intergeneration-
al allocations across cultures and institutions, we may be able to 
ensure that our own generations’ legacy is more stable, just and 
sustainable.
This paper indexes intergenerational solidarity across 120 coun-
tries and 92% of the world’s population, and begins to address 
this gap in the literature. The index includes nine variables, three 
each from economic, environmental and social dimensions, 
and aims to provide a common independent variable for those 
researching the causes of cross-cultural variations in intergener-
ational solidarity. Iterations of the index could also allow us to 
keep track of whether societies are (in theory) giving greater or less 
intergenerational solidarity from one year to another.
Anecdotally, it has long been said that the current generation 
discounts the future4 to a greater extent than those before them. 
Laugier asserts:
“The ancients jealous of leaving to the latest posterity traces of 
their abilities, spared nothing in giving to their buildings that 
strength which triumphs over common accidents... Our artists 
have now­a­days none of that great taste of solidity. They doubt if 
their works can sustain the assault of three centuries. They are ac­
cused even of avoiding with design to render them lasting, because 
they are supposed interested to renew the labour of them. It is most 
certain that one often sees amongst our buildings quite new ones 
that threaten ruin.” (Laugier 1755: 129)
Are we, as Laugier says, becoming more short-termist? Are we 
thus heaping greater burdens on future generations? Are the rea-
sons he suggests valid? This index is a first step to answering these 
questions.
Conceptual framework
“Intergenerational justice” is a concept here defined as synony-
mous with “intergenerational equity”. Defining what actually is 
“equitable” is impossible to do a priori in the context of future 
generations, who are silent in their preferences, of an unknown 
number, and of unknown means. Nonetheless, this does not pre-
vent us from comparing intergenerational allocations, here set in 
the context of intergenerational solidarity.
“Intergenerational solidarity” does not yet have a standardised 
definition. Until the Rio+20 conference, “intergenerational” usu-
ally meant “between old and young generations” (World Future 
Council 2013). Here, as in current sustainability usage, intergen-
erational solidarity “goes beyond relations among the currently 
living representatives of different generations to embrace the fu-
ture generations who do not yet exist” (United Nations 2013). 
“Solidarity” in this context can be approximated by “intentional 
actions that increases or sustains wellbeing” (see Lopes 2015) usu-
ally involving “sacrifices and investments” (United Nations 2013). 
A
If we can first quantify and then find causes for varia-
tions in intergenerational allocations across cultures 
and institutions, we may be able to ensure that our own 
generations’ legacy is more stable, just and sustainable.
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Thus, the working definition of “intergenerational solidarity” for 
this paper might be “investments or sacrifices that are intended to 
increase or sustain the wellbeing of future generations”. This can 
be said to be the means by which we carry out our impression of 
what is intergenerationally just.5
Criteria for selection
The criteria for selecting indicators (after Hsu et al. 2013; OECD 
2008) are as follows:
Theoretical relevance. Indicators must have a strong conceptual 
relationship to intergenerational resource allocation and to hu-
man wellbeing.
Coverage. The index must cover >100 national entities contain-
ing >90% of the world’s population, and its range must be such 
that it is able to distinguish countries in a meaningful way.
Comprehensiveness. The index must include indicators relating 
to economic, environmental and social spheres in equal measure. 
Each metric must not have disproportionate influence over the to-
tal index. Few or no indicators should be missing for any country.
Transparency. The number of indicators should be concise, and 
assumptions, sources and transformations should be clear. The in-
dex should avoid a “black box” approach.
Source Quality. Sources must be respected, use standardised col-
lection methods and provide open access.
Future-proof. There must be an on-going commitment from 
source institutions to regularly update indicator data.
National accounts are the level of analysis for a practical reason: 
reliable and comparable data simply do not or cannot yet exist 
for measuring intergenerational solidarity of component parts of 
society, such as companies, civil society organisations, individuals 
or governments.
However, it seems reasonable that national statistics may have a 
bias towards revealing of the priorities of governments, although 
they will also be affected by the choices of individuals and institu-
tions. It is also often assumed that part of the duty of government, 
in the implicit6 social contract that legitimates them, is to work 
for the demos of today and the future – this is less so for other 
parts of society.
Similar existing work
Little work has been done to construct cross-cultural indexes of 
intergenerational solidarity or similar measures, especially out-
side of the OECD. In a paper correlating cultural values and 
long-termist policy, Kasser (2011) used advertising to children, 
CO2 emissions, parental leave and child wellbeing. Elsewhere, 
Vanhuysse (2013) used a figure of public debt per child, ecolog-
ical footprint and age-based differences in poverty to compile an 
“Intergeneration Justice Index”. Also, Noguchi et al. (2014) used 
Google searches for future years as an indicator of national future 
orientation.
Kasser’s work is an example of where this index can be useful, as a 
framework for researchers in disparate fields looking to correlate 
their own dependent variables (cultural values in his case) with 
intergenerational solidarity.
In the sustainability literature, there are a vast array of composite 
indexes (for a review of some, see Singh et al. 2012; Stiglitz et al. 
2009) but almost all do not focus on the future. One exception 
is the World Bank’s Adjusted Net Savings (ANS; included in this 
paper; see the section on Economic Indicators for more details). 
This is the best-known attempt at a comprehensive economic 
measure of changes in capital stocks, and includes measures of 
environmental and human capital. Unfortunately, its assump-
tions and ethical framework are dubious (Thiry/Cassiers 2010); 
the most important objection is that, as with other indicators of 
“weak” sustainability (Pierce/Atkinson 1993), it is over-simplistic 
in its assumption that all value can be adequately reduced into 
fungible dimensions denominated in dollars.
On the other hand, the Index of Economic Wellbeing (Osberg/
Sharpe 2002) does have a similar aim but does not quantify 
everything in dollars. Its other dimensions are interesting – par-
ticularly the “economic security” dimension which addresses risks 
rather than value – but the datasets the authors use only exist for 
a fraction of OECD countries.
Environmental indexes (e.g. Hsu et al. 2014) often measure 
 effects over the long term, but differences in time horizons are 
rarely acknowledged. For instance, radioactive pollution is a sig-
nificant issue for future generations, whereas particulate pollu-
tion is largely not. CO2-equivalent greenhouse gas indexes are a 
notable exception; global warming potential is usually explicitly 
calculated over 100-year time horizons (Shine 2009), so as to ad-
just the impacts of e.g. short-lived methane vs. long-lived carbon 
dioxide.
Method
Operationalising “intergenerational solidarity”
Intergenerational solidarity’s “investments or sacrifices” can be 
expressed in terms of change to the value and stability of various 
kinds of non-substitutable7 inherited capital. Capital encompass-
es a society’s “manufactured capital, human capital, natural cap-
ital, and knowledge, but also its institutions” (Dasgupta 2001: 
142). Stability implies resilience, “the capacity of a system to ab-
sorb disturbance and reorganise while undergoing change so as to 
still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity, and 
feedbacks”; adaptability, “the capacity of actors in a system to in-
fluence resilience”; and transformability, “the capacity to create a 
Are we, as Laugier says, becoming more short-termist? 
Are we thus heaping greater burdens on future gene-
rations?
Figure 1: Index of Economic Wellbeing weighting tree (Osberg/Sharpe 
2002)
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fundamentally new system when ecological, economic, or social 
(including political) conditions make the existing system untena-
ble” (Walker et al. 2004). For example, building a house with in-
tergenerational solidarity in mind might mean building a sturdy, 
useful, low-impact structure (i.e. with high capital value) that is 
designed to be flexible to different uses (resilient), easily repairable 
and adjustable (adaptable), and might be recycled at the end of its 
useful life (transformable).
However, although they are crucial to intergenerational solidarity, 
parameters of stability are highly specific to whatever individual 
system they refer to, and it is not possible to measure them on 
aggregate at a national level.8 Instead, in this index they are dis-
cussed when they relate to other indicators.
The index aims to measure proportional solidarity: from each na-
tion according to its ability to give. However, the poorest nations 
must prioritise survival needs above all, something reflected in the 
generally high social discount rates set by governments of devel-
oping countries (Zhuang et al. 2007).
Selecting indicators
A longlist of candidates was selected and winnowed.9 Nine in-
dicators were chosen in sets of three, each primarily focused on 
economic, environmental or social dimensions. This number 
allows for simplicity whilst ensuring that no one indicator had 
disproportionate influence. All of the indicators are likely to be 
proxies of several kinds of capital, but were grouped according to 
their primary focus.
It should go without saying that this index is not intended to 
be precise or comprehensive, but rather a working yardstick for 
an otherwise unmeasurable composite construct. In the aim to 
make an index with wide coverage of countries, it is also inevitable 
that indicators will be excluded that would otherwise give greater 
precision.
Normalising and aggregating indicators
After selection, the indicators were normalised to a common 
range of 0-100. The boundaries were set based on the boundaries 
of the original range or on benchmarks based on literature or data 
distribution. The goal of normalising the indicators was to give 
thresholds, not targets. For example, in the indicator of forest deg-
radation, “zero net loss” is the benchmark for 100. Net gain may 
or may not indicate intergenerational solidarity, but here is not 
given more “credit” than zero net loss. To give another example, 
the upper bound for primary pupil-to-teacher ratio was set at 10:1 
and the bottom at 50:1 purely from data distribution; prescriptive 
targets for this indicator simply do not exist.
Importantly, this means that scores on indicators (and thus the in-
dex) only make sense in terms of comparisons between countries.
Where noted, some indicators were normalised for population 
or GDP (with purchasing power parity) or transformed to give 
greater weight to relatively small differences or to cluster extreme 
differences. The standard equation used was:
which is a variant of that used in the Environmental Performance 
Index (Hsu et al. 2013) and the Human Development Index 
(UNDP 2014). Details are given where this was modified.
Most indicators averaged the most recent available data (following 
the method of Vanhuysse 2013), over the most recent five years – 
a common policy timeframe – to smooth fluctuations. However, 
countries were not excluded if some years used in the average were 
missing.
All indicators have equal weight but are aggregated geometri-
cally following the method of the Human Development Index 
(UNDP 2014). Equal weighting is common in composite indexes 
(Böhringer/Jochem 2007), particularly in the absence of clear the-
ory on their relative importance.
Geometric aggregation takes the following form, with indicator 
scores represented by i and the number of indicators n:
Geometric aggregation, while more difficult to communicate than 
linear aggregation, partially rectifies the problem of the unsubsti-
tutability of capital stocks and flows (Hsu et al. 2013). It ensures 
that high scores in the index should reflect a high score in most 
of the indicators, rather than particular excellence in a few areas, 
and that low scores are disproportionately penalised (Böhringer/
Jochem 2007; Ebert/Welsch 2004), suiting it to indexes aggregat-
ing radically different dimensions (OECD 2008; UNDP 2010). 
It also means that more critical attention should be paid to the 
assumptions behind benchmarks and transformations. For in-
stance, one extremely low indicator will have a significant effect 
on the final score: even if eight indicators score 100, if the last 
scores one10 then the index will only give a total score of 60.
There is a long-running debate in sustainability literature about 
the dangers inherent in aggregating indicators (OECD 2008). 
However, intergenerational solidarity only has meaning in terms 
of an aggregate of its component parts. As Stiglitz et al. put it, 
“composite indicators are better regarded as invitations to look 
more closely at the various components that underlie them” 
(Stiglitz et al. 2009: 65).
Environmental Indicators
To be in solidarity with future generations, today’s generations 
must curtail pollution and ecological degradation and ensure that 
resources are used with an eye to limits. Specifically, greenhouse 
gas emissions, soil degradation, biodiversity loss and nutrient pol-
lution appear to be the issues with greatest cause for global alarm 
(Bindraban et al. 2012; Steffen et al. 2015). Unfortunately, there 
Environmental indexes often measure effects over the 
long term, but differences in time horizons are rarely 
acknowledged. For instance, radioactive pollution is a 
significant issue for future generations, whereas particu-
late pollution is largely not.
Intergenerational solidarity only has meaning in terms 
of an aggregate of its component parts.
100 
Observed value – minimum
Target – minimum
𝑖𝑖1× 𝑖𝑖2 …× 𝑖𝑖n
1
n
100 ∙
0.6
x ∙ G 
100 
Observed value – minimum
Target – minimum
𝑖𝑖1× 𝑖𝑖2 …× 𝑖𝑖n
1
n
100 ∙
0.6
x ∙ G 
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are only national accounts of greenhouse gas emissions, due to 
measurement difficulties. However, the three indicators chosen 
for the index – forest degradation, carbon footprint and low-car-
bon energy use – can be considered proxies for soil degradation 
and biodiversity loss inasmuch as these are exacerbated by climate 
change (Nearing et al. 2004; Thomas et al. 2004) or are caused 
by deforestation (Maina et al. 2013; Mendenhall et al. 2012; 
Siikamäki/Newbold 2012).
Forest degradation is the only indicator with missing data for 
some countries, due to lack of forest cover. To compensate, in 
these instances the weighting of the other two environmental in-
dicators was increased from 1/9 to 1/6, in order to preserve equal-
ity of contribution from each dimension.
Environmental Indicator: Net forest degradation
The indicator
Satellite data for forest density in 30m2 blocks were used (Hansen 
et al. 2013b) because of the much greater accuracy of that data-
base over UN FAO self-report data (UNFAO 2014, see Hansen 
et al. 2013a). A twelve-year average was used based on the limited 
data currently published, to which the authors have guaranteed 
regular updates. Only forest of >50% canopy was used because of 
limitations on forest gain data, and 19 countries with <200km2 of 
this were excluded, after the EPI method (Hsu et al. 2014). 
10% annual loss was used as a lower benchmark as the worst per-
former’s loss rate of 16.8% was extreme (Figure 2). Zero net loss 
was the upper benchmark as the afforestation of some nations 
is ecologically questionable (e.g. see Geary 2001 for discussion 
of Uruguay’s 22% increase). Only 10 of 120 included nations 
achieved zero net loss.
Theoretical basis
“The diligent farmer plants trees of which he will never taste the fruit” 
(arbores seret diligens agricola, quarum aspiciet bacam ipse  nunquam)
– Cicero in Tusculanae Disputationes, c.45 BCE
Forest husbandry is inherently a long-termist enterprise, whether 
by preservation or active plantation. For example, in an extraor-
dinary continuous act of intergenerational solidarity, peasant cop-
pice foresters in 2nd-millenium European countries would often 
rotate coppice-with-standards on regular cycles of 30 years for the 
coppice understorey, and up to 160 years for the overstorey that 
grew above them (Short/Hawe 2012). It also seems plausible that 
a country that conserves its trees may protect other ecosystems.
However, the indicator is not sensitive to the fine-grain forest 
ecology. Will future generations prefer diverse old-growth forest 
ecosystems, or relatively barren reforested but economically-pref-
erable Sitka spruce plantation as is common in Europe (Magura 
et al. 2002)? Or would they prefer an ecologically-sensitive agro-
forestry regime to any of these, something classed as “degraded 
forest” here?
Lastly, trees do not just fall to chainsaws – they are also affected 
by storms, climate change, fire, disease, drought and a number of 
other factors (Le et al. 2012). Notable instances of this are cyclone 
damage in Sweden (4.1% annual net loss – see Valinger/Fridman 
2011), and beetle plagues in Canada (3.7% loss – see Kurz et al. 
2008). Nonetheless, it is quite clear that humans are driving the 
degradation in most countries (Hansen et al. 2013a).
Future directions
Some countries are reducing degradation rate substantially – for 
example, Brazil’s loss in 2011 was over two-thirds less than the 
1996-2005 average by one measure (Boucher et al. 2011). When 
annual data are available, it may be better to look at a predicted 
long-term trend in degradation rate. It may also be possible to 
control for natural causes of degradation discussed above. Also, 
once satellite data on forest gain of <50% canopy cover exist, it 
may be preferable to differentiate clear-felling from degradation.
Environmental Indicator: Carbon footprint (consumption­based)
The indicator
The consumption-based carbon footprint is a component of the 
ecological footprint. All data come from the 2011 dataset (Global 
Footprint Network 2015) except for Iceland’s, which was estimated 
The three indicators chosen for the index – forest 
degradation, carbon footprint and low-carbon energy 
use – can be considered proxies for soil degradation and 
biodiversity loss inasmuch as these are exacerbated by 
climate change or are caused by deforestation.
The indicator is not sensitive to the fine-grain forest 
ecology. Will future generations prefer diverse old-
growth forest ecosystems, or relatively barren reforested 
but economically-preferable Sitka spruce plantation 
as is common in Europe? Or would they prefer an 
ecologically- sensitive agroforestry regime to any of 
these, something classed as “degraded forest” here?
Table 1: Equation, definition and data source for net forest degrada­
tion indicator
Table 2: Equation, definition and data source for consumption­based 
carbon footprint indicator
Figure 2: Relationship between forest degradation indicator scores 
and annual forest loss
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to be the same as Norway’s because of similarities in consumption 
patterns, consumer imports and renewable energy production.
The world’s average carbon footprint was estimated to be 1.4 
global hectares per capita (Gha/c) in 2009, and average ecologi-
cal footprint 2.6 Gha/c. The world’s biocapacity was estimated at 
1.8 Gha/c. Assuming that most of this 0.8 Gha/c reduction must 
come from carbon emissions, the target carbon footprint should 
be 0.6 Gha/c. This target is consistent with the data: Algeria, 
 Ecuador, Guatemala and Jamaica all have ecological footprints of 
1.8 Gha/c and have carbon emissions of 0.5-0.8 Gha/c.
A simple reciprocal transformation was used to adjust the scale, 
meaning that doubling footprint halves the indicator value – i.e. 
1.2 Gha/c = 50, and 2.4 Gha = 25.
Theoretical basis
The benefits of emitting greenhouse gases are frontloaded and se-
vere damage is back-loaded over thousands of years (Solomon et 
al. 2009). It also is the only part of the ecological footprint which 
can go into “debt”; i.e. the other components cannot by definition 
exceed the earth’s biocapacity. There is also a general consensus 
that it is more useful than the greater ecological footprint measure 
(Stiglitz et al. 2009: 71, 80).
Consumption-based emissions implicitly assign greater responsibil-
ity to consumers to reduce consumption or demand better efficien-
cy, which is often justified by the current economic inequality be-
tween consumers and producers. However, it should be noted that 
currently, many low per-capita CO2 emissions are often not due to 
intergenerational solidarity but rather a sign of poverty (Figure 4).
Future directions
It might be argued that this indicator should be corrected for 
GDP, not done here to preserve simplicity. In particular, a “car-
bon intensity” (Davis/Caldeira 2010) correction of the following 
form was considered:
where G is GDP/c and current footprint (x) was set at a minimum 
of 0.6 Gha/c to emphasise the need for economic development. 
This formula would, in a rough way,12 measure how much GDP 
is generated within the quota of 0.6 Gha/c and rank countries 
accordingly.
Environmental Indicator: Low­carbon energy generation
The indicator
This indicator measures energy use from minimal-CO2 energy 
sources such as geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear, wind and solar. 
It excludes biofuels such as sugarcane or corn ethanol. A square-root 
transformation (Figure 5) was applied for reasons explored below.
Theoretical basis
Fossil fuel use makes up a large part of most nations’ CO2e 
emissions (e.g. c.79% for the USA in 2013 – US Environmen-
tal Protection Agency 2015) and the high cost and long life-
Consumption-based emissions implicitly assign greater 
responsibility to consumers to reduce consumption or 
demand better efficiency, which is often justified by the 
current economic inequality between consumers and 
producers. However, it should be noted that currently, 
many low per-capita CO2 emissions are often not due to 
intergenerational solidarity but rather a sign of poverty.
100 
Observed value – minimum
Target – minimum
𝑖𝑖1× 𝑖𝑖2 …× 𝑖𝑖n
1
n
100 ∙
0.6
x ∙ G 
Figure 3: Relationship between carbon footprint and indicator scores
Figure 4: GDP and carbon footprint (2011 data)
Table 3: Equation, definition and data source for low­carbon energy 
use indicator
Figure 5: Relationship between low­carbon energy generation indi­
cator scores and low­carbon energy generation, including for export
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times of its infrastructure entails formidable path dependency. 
Given the urgent need for drastic decarbonisation of energy 
 generation, current low-carbon energy use improves the well being 
of future generations not only through emitting less CO2, but 
also through not deferring the cost of investing in low-carbon 
infrastructure.
Nuclear fuel is non-renewable, but including it adds a particularly 
long-term component to this indicator, given its vital current role 
in decarbonising energy generation. Much has been said about 
long-term planning of nuclear waste disposal (and lack there-
of ), but nuclear energy remains one of the most long-term-ori-
ented enterprises that industrial civilisation undertakes. A plant 
lifecycle may be 100 years, and fuel disposal must plan for ra-
dioactive  isotopes with half-lives of millennia. For example, the 
Onkalo deep geological repository in Finland is midway through 
an  80-year design, operation and decommissioning cycle and is 
 expected to safely store nuclear waste for 10,000 years (Nummi 
et al. 2012: 38).
It should also be noted that a very high score is often due to a 
combination of easy availability of hydroelectric dam sites and low 
populations rather than long-term planning. Particular examples of 
this are Norway, Paraguay, Iceland (also geothermal) and Tajikistan. 
In order to elevate the scores of less favoured countries that still 
invest in the long term, a square root transformation was applied.
Future directions
An assessment of the sustainability of biofuels and household 
waste might significantly improve the accuracy of the indicator 
in some countries. For example, in Brazil 22.9% of energy con-
sumption in 2012 came from biofuels (IEA 2015b). However, 
sufficient source data and precise theory on the sustainability of 
biofuels are currently lacking.
It may also be possible to adjust for the CO2e impact of renew-
ables, for example from the titanic quantities of cement used in 
some hydroelectric dams and the vast quantities of methane re-
leased from tropical reservoirs. Currently, however, there is too 
much uncertainty about lifecycle analyses of both this and biofu-
els for them to be taken into account (Johnson 2009; Liska et al. 
2014; Melillo et al. 2009).
Economic Indicators
Increasing the wealth of nations is critical for future welfare, yet 
current policy is often focused on optimising production, rather 
than the sustainability or division of future wealth (Stiglitz et al. 
2009). In order to address these issues, the economic dimension 
includes the adjusted annual amount of product saved, the sus-
tainability of current investment, and the distribution of wealth.
The central government social discount rate used in calculating 
cost-benefit analyses is unfortunately omitted here. Despite its 
importance to intergenerational projects and particularly to cli-
mate change mitigation and adaptation, many countries have no 
available social discount rate or different rates between depart-
ments (Zhuang et al. 2007). Currently, its use is worryingly arbi-
trary; Moore et al. (2004) memorably characterise policy-makers 
as demanding that economists “just give me a number!”
Economic Indicator: Adjusted Net Savings
The indicator
Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) is an attempt at a catch-all indicator 
for “sustainable investment”. It is calculated by taking gross sav-
ings (itself made up of gross capital formation, net capital inflows 
and changes in foreign reserves) and subtracting estimated re-
source depletion, emissions damages from particulates and CO2, 
and consumption of fixed capital, and adding public spending 
on education (Figure 6). The World Bank calls it an indicator 
of a broadly-defined “weak sustainability” (Bolt et al. 2002) that 
assumes substitutability of different kinds of capital.
Adjusted Net Savings is currently the most comprehensive dol-
lar-equivalent index of changes in capital, covering 173 nations 
and groupings. It was normalised in the range 0-20% of GNI 
based on data distribution (Figure 7).
Much has been said about long-term planning of nucle-
ar waste disposal (and lack thereof), but nuclear energy 
remains one of the most long-term-oriented enterprises 
that industrial civilisation undertakes. A plant lifecycle 
may be 100 years, and fuel disposal must plan for radio-
active isotopes with half-lives of millennia.
The economic dimension includes the adjusted annual 
amount of product saved, the sustainability of current 
investment, and the distribution of wealth.
Table 4: Equation, definition and data source for Adjusted Net 
 Savings indicator
Figure 6: Calculating Adjusted Net Savings (World Bank 2006)
Figure 7: Relationship between ANS indicator score and ANS
Intergenerational Justice Review
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Theoretical basis
That Adjusted Net Savings essentially measures consumption de-
ferred to the future. However, ANS has been robustly criticised, 
amongst other reasons for assumptions of substitutability of capi-
tal, production-based responsibility for pollution, market valuing 
of resources and so on – see Pillarisetti (2005) and Thiry/Cassiers 
(2010) for summaries. It also seems to have only a weak relation-
ship to other indicators that might be considered to be proxies 
for the wellbeing of future generations, e.g. infant mortality and 
Human Development Index (Gnègnè 2009). Following Stiglitz et 
al. (2009), it seems best to treat it as a measure of savings of solely 
economic wealth; we should not forget John Ruskin’s caution that 
“that which seems to be wealth may in verity be only the gilded 
index of far reaching ruin” (Ruskin 1872: 52).
Future directions
ANS may be superseded by more comprehensive indexes with 
similar aims such as the Inclusive Wealth Index (UNU-IHDP/
UNEO 2014). However, this also has poor assumptions, such as 
an economic valuation of human life proportionate to GDP per 
capita, with the consequence that an African’s life is “worth” less 
than a European’s.
Economic Indicator: Current account balance
The indicator
The current account quantifies the balance of flows of goods and 
services in and out of a national economy, as well as investment 
income and unreciprocated transfers (e.g. international aid and 
remittances). Simplistically, a deficit in the current account must 
be met by selling assets or foreign borrowing. Cut-offs were based 
on theoretic concerns as described below, and no transformation 
was applied (Figure 8).
Theoretical basis
Current account deficits directly affect capital transfer to future 
generations. Today’s deficits require matching future surpluses 
financed by exports, higher savings or lower investment (Olivei 
2000); another description of these patterns is “intertemporal 
trade” (Corden 2011; Leimbach/Baumstark 2011).
A deficit is not necessarily bad if the foreign investment potential 
outweighs the costs of incurring debt or selling assets (Blanchard/
Milesi-Ferreti 2012), but even “good” deficits mean borrowing or 
selling assets against future income and are risky (Obstfeld 2012), 
potentially making whole economies less resilient. This has been 
shown many times in massive investment failures in developing 
countries, and capital flight as a result of asset bubbles (Edwards 
2004).
While there is a consensus that significant current account deficits 
are “bad” because they imply instability (Boljanović 2012; Ed-
wards 2004), it is difficult to be precise in giving a range to this 
indicator. A lower bound of -10% of GDP can be justified by risk, 
looking at the current account deficits that predicated various 
capital flight14 crises and the economic performance of countries 
in the Eurozone in the last 10 years.15 For example, immediately 
before their crisis in 1997, the South East Asian economies had 
deficits of between 2% and 8% (Radelet/Sachs 1998), and a 5% 
current account deficit is generally considered to be problematic 
(Boljanović 2012).
The upper bound is not higher than 0% (no net “intertemporal 
trading”) because current account surpluses, while often good for 
future wellbeing in individual nations, are sometimes damaging 
to the nation (Blanchard/Milesi-Ferreti 2012) and imply a deficit 
in other countries.
Future directions
A more refined metric might disaggregate the causes of current 
account deficits (e.g. differentiate consumption binges from de-
velopment aid), which can determine to a great extent whether 
they cause crises (Milesi-Ferretti et al. 1996). It might also penal-
ise countries, particularly those with above-average GDP, which 
have excessive surpluses in the long term without a good cause 
(e.g. Germany). More work should also be done to examine the 
multi-decadal current account deficits of the USA, UK and others 
– in the argument of “monetary hegemony”, these countries may 
be able to sustain long-term deficits with few ill effects as an effect 
of demand created by their currencies being used as international 
reserves.
Economic Indicator: Wealth inequality
A deficit is not necessarily bad if the foreign investment 
potential outweighs the costs of incurring debt or 
selling assets, but even “good” deficits mean borrowing 
or  selling assets against future income and are risky, 
 potentially making whole economies less resilient.
Table 5: Equation, definition and data source for current account 
balance indicator
Figure 8: Relationship between current account balance indicator 
scores and current account balance
Table 6: Equation, definition and data source for wealth inequality 
indicator
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The indicator
National wealth data including its Gini coefficient are not col-
lected by any intergovernmental agency with coverage larger than 
the OECD, but are currently estimated annually by Crédit Su-
isse. Crédit Suisse are widely respected, use a transparent method 
(Shorrocks et al. 2014) and give quality ratings for the estimations 
for each country. Their definition of wealth includes financial as-
sets, housing and land; liabilities are subtracted; and their analysis 
applies to adult individuals (i.e. not households) aged over 20.
The equation for this indicator includes a square transformation 
which has been inverted and shifted towards the y axis. Superfi-
cially similar to a logarithmic transformation, it gives a steeper 
gradient in mid-values for improved differentiation.
Theoretical basis
The inclusion of this indicator rests on an ethical argument about 
the inheritance of future generations, based on the well-known 
“veil of ignorance” theory (Rawls 1999) of morality and a wide-
ly-held belief that wealth can give wellbeing only if it is equally or 
meritocratically distributed (Piketty 2014). Given that economic 
growth is finite, future poverty reduction will mean wealth redis-
tribution (Daly 1990). Also, it seems reasonable that equal wealth 
distribution indicates long-term social planning and strong insti-
tutions, as it requires strong redistributive institutions and takes 
time to implement.
While wealth data are noisier than income data, the relative 
persistence of wealth inequality, its causative role in persistent 
income inequality and its greater importance to wellbeing and 
illbeing (particularly regarding security) prioritises its inclusion 
(Carter/Barrett 2006; Headey/Wooden 2004; Kuypers/Marx 
2016; Piketty 2015; Ruberton et al. 2016). Wealth also plays a 
smoothing role in household economies through reducing un-
certainty, which may be more relevant to rates of intertemporal 
savings than average income itself (Sørensen 2013).
A Gini index of 0 is unachievable and may also be undesirable 
within the current economic framework; there are likely to be 
diminishing returns to wellbeing below a certain level. However, 
given the absence of an empirically-derived “ideal” value of wealth 
inequality, it is used as an upper bound.
Future directions
Measurements of household wealth are still in their infancy. The 
method and data for this indicator should be given particular scru-
tiny in future updates, and it may be possible to take account of 
different levels of public provision of e.g. housing, health and ed-
ucation that can lessen the effects of inequalities in private wealth. 
The range for the indicator might also be adjusted based on theory.
As data resolution and coverage continue to improve, it may be 
feasible to incorporate data sources with more robust methods 
(e.g. Alvaredo et al. 2017) or specific components, such as the 
share of public wealth. Also, incorporating work on the relation-
ship between wealth and time discounting may strengthen the 
conceptual foundation of this indicator.
Social Indicators
The social dimension of sustainability is notoriously difficult to 
define, and has been characterised as “a concept in chaos” (Val-
lance et al. 2011: 342). Here, the indicators measure the inher-
itance of human capital in the form of education and health, but 
it seems that indicators of future social capital do not exist.16 As 
a compromise, an adjusted fertility rate is used as an indicator of 
social capital, with the argument that too-high and too-low rates 
may predict difficulties for social institutions.
Social Indicator: Primary pupil­teacher ratio
The indicator
This indicator measures the number of teachers for every pupil 
in publicly-funded primary education (UNESCO 2012). Due to 
poor collection, some countries have only one data point in the 
last 10 years, hence the long average. It should also be noted that 
this indicator is not the same as class size.
Due to lack of conclusive targets in the literature, the indicator 
benchmarks were based mostly on a subjective assessment of 
data distribution, with no transformation. Only three countries 
in the index (Iceland, Sweden and Norway) had better ratios than 
10:1, and only 10 nations had ratios greater than 50:1, ranging 
up to 76:1 for Malawi (Figure 10). “Large class size” is also some-
times defined as >50:1 (Jin/Cortazzi 1998; Qiang/Ning 2011); 
Given economic growth is finite, future poverty reduc-
tion will mean wealth redistribution. Also, it seems 
reasonable that equal wealth distribution indicates 
long-term social planning and strong institutions, as it 
requires strong redistributive institutions and takes time 
to implement.
The social dimension of sustainability is notoriously dif-
ficult to define, and has been characterised as “a concept 
in chaos” (Vallance et al. 2011: 342).
Figure 9: Relationship between wealth inequality indicator scores and 
wealth­Gini coefficient
Table 7: Equation, definition and data source for primary pupil­ 
teacher indicator
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Krueger (2011) found improved results for class size at least down 
to 15:1.
Changes in the values of the benchmarks were also analysed to 
ensure that overall index results were not sensitive to them; e.g. a 
lower boundary of 60:1 would affect index scores by <1 point on 
average, and change rankings by an average of 2 places, with very 
little effects on the countries at the top of the rankings.
Theoretical basis
“To plan one year ahead, plant grains. (一年之計，莫如樹穀) 
To plan ten years ahead, plant trees. (十年之計，莫如樹木) 
To plan a lifespan ahead, plant people. (終身之計，莫如樹人)”
- Guan Zhong (管仲) and other scholars as quoted in the Guanzi 
(管子), 7th to 4th century BCE
Primary education was specifically chosen because it is an in-
vestment in the wellbeing of future generations that is not likely 
to directly benefit current generations for 10-20 years at least. 
Also, as the Secretary-General of the United Nations put it:
“Education is itself critical to intergenerational solidarity 
as the means of transmitting accumulated, or at least the 
most recent, scientific and other knowledge to future gene rations.” 
(United Nations 2013: 8)
Regardless of educational outcomes, it is also indicative of a more 
general societal willingness to trade off current wellbeing (money 
spent on teachers’ salary17) for others in the future (Kasser 2011).
Secondary and particularly tertiary education were excluded be-
cause they are less comparable between countries because of great-
er differences in public and private education models, and because 
they are more directly linked to the economic interests of current 
generations.
Future directions
In some nations with pyramidal demographic structures, a high 
pupil-teacher ratio may not be caused by lower prioritisation of 
education, but instead purely by the ratio of children to adults. 
It may be possible to correct for this. A priority for this indicator 
should be to incorporate research into the differential effects of 
the pupil-teacher ratio on educational achievement, as it seems 
quite unlikely that there is a purely linear effect. 
Social Indicator: Fertility rate
The indicator
This indicator measures the predicted fertility rate using a linear 
extrapolation of the trend of the last five years, in order to measure 
policy as opposed to current status. Countries where the regres-
sion coefficient for the previous five years was ≤0.5 were instead 
predicted using the average of the last five years. The indicator 
score is calculated using the formula above, giving a representa-
tion of “distance from the optimum”, either positive or negative 
(Figure 11). The square of the full fraction was added to address 
the fact that population does not grow or shrink linearly and small 
differences make large effects; if left unsquared, a fertility rate of 
7.2 would score 25 despite being socially problematic.
The selected optimum value of 1.8 is theoretically based on an 
assumed replacement-level fertility of 2.1, and explained further 
below. The figure of 2.1 is below replacement for countries with 
significant mortality rates before menopause (Espenshade et al. 
2003). As a partial correction for this, fertility rates were multi-
plied by the fraction of children surviving to five years; data for 
later pre-fertility years could not be currently obtained.
Theoretical basis
Population growth and decline is an emotive and controversial 
subject that has often been simplistically addressed in economics 
The indicators measure the inheritance of human capital 
in the form of education and health, but it seems that 
indicators of future social capital do not exist.
A shrinking population might sometimes be beneficial, 
implying that absolute GDP, footprint and so on may be 
reduced while maintaining or increasing GDP per capita. 
However, too much reduction […] may also result in so-
called “government of the elderly, by the elderly and for 
the elderly” as in Japan.
Figure 10: Relationship between pupil­teacher ratio indicator score 
and pupil­teacher ratio
Table 8: Equation, definition and data source for fertility rate 
 indicator
Figure 11: Relationship between fertility rate indicator and adjusted 
fertility rate
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and sustainability literature. However, there are several arguments 
for its inclusion in a measure of intergenerational solidarity.
First, as is noted in the I=f(P,A,T)18 equation (Alcott 2010), a 
rising population may increase impact on the environment. This 
applies most in the richest countries, as the majority of growth 
in developing nations comes from the families with the lowest 
footprints (Aassve et al. 2005). However, in these nations it may 
imply increasing inequality, expansion of slums and pressure on 
social institutions (Davis 2006). Population growth may also neg-
atively affect future wellbeing through reduction in share of scarce 
resources such as water.
A shrinking population might sometimes be beneficial, implying 
that absolute GDP, footprint and so on may be reduced while 
maintaining or increasing GDP per capita. However, too much 
reduction at once means that few young people are left to care for 
elderly dependents. This is especially so if, as in many developed 
countries, lifespans have increased but pensioning ages have not. 
It may also result in so-called “government of the elderly, by the 
elderly and for the elderly” as in Japan (Coulmas 2007: 92).
On balance, it seems prudent for countries to aim for fertility 
rates of less than replacement, but not too low. The “optimum” 
of 1.8 was chosen conservatively based on figures tentatively sug-
gested by demographers Striessnig and Lutz (2014) in research 
involving thousands of simulated populations. They state “longer-
term fertility levels somewhere between 1.5 and 1.8 are the best 
for our planet and will, at the same time, result in future higher 
welfare as long as we invest more in… education.”
Future directions
It is preferable to correct for differences in the death rates of chil-
dren and younger adults in a more extensive way than using just 
child mortality rates. Net reproduction rate (Espenshade et al. 
2003) should replace the current formula as soon as data make 
it feasible. Additional theory might be used to better inform the 
slopes of the indicator adjustments, and to benchmark the opti-
mum figure.
In addition, the 1.8 target used currently is not a fair target for 
countries early in demographic transition. For these, it may be 
possible to use a more complex formula that compares current 
and predicted adjusted fertility rates in order to compensate for 
this.
Social Indicator: GDP­adjusted child mortality
The indicator
This indicator examines child (under-5) mortality. In order to 
correct for GDP, for each year a power regression was calculat-
ed (Figure 12) which was used to estimate what child mortality 
“should” be based on a country’s per-capita income. Observed 
child mortality was expressed as a percentage of this, and entered 
into the equation above. The upper and lower benchmarks were 
chosen based on the data range, and for explanatory power: a 
score of 50 is equivalent to matching the predicted mortality rate, 
and every point of difference from that is a % distance from that 
rate (i.e. a score of 75 implies a country is 25% below the predict-
ed mortality rate).
Theoretical basis
Health is one the main forms of human capital that are passed 
on between generations, and child mortality is used here as an 
indicator of the health component of the next generation’s human 
capital. It is also widely regarded as one of the best indicators 
of current national health status (Wang 2002). However, GDP 
is a significant direct and indirect causal variable (O’Hare et al. 
2013); of the years 2008-2012 it predicted an average of 74.9% 
of variance in child mortality (log-log, see Figure 12 for 2012’s 
regression). As this index measures intergenerational solidarity 
proportional to ability to give, it seems reasonable to control for 
GDP per capita. To illustrate, Iceland has one of the lowest child 
mortality rates in the world, declining from 2.7 to 2.2 per 1,000 
over 2008-12. Based on the regression of all countries, and given 
its GDP of $44 200, we might expect it to have a 2012 child 
mortality rate of 5.3; it is doing more than twice as well as might 
be expected, and therefore receives 100 in the index. Other coun-
tries with similar ratios are Cuba, South Korea and Eritrea; while 
Eritrea has a 2012 child mortality rate of 51.6 per 1000, it is so 
poor that this is around half its expected rate, and its high score 
in the indicator seems justified given its comparatively successful 
campaigns against malaria (Mufunde et al. 2007) and maternal 
mortality (Holzgreve et al. 2012).
There seem to be several causal pathways to decreasing child mor-
tality, and disagreement about which are most important in which 
contexts. However, in developing nations a considerable amount 
of the variance seems to be driven by female education (Filmer/
Pritchett 1999; Gakidou et al. 2010) – another form of intergen-
erational capital transfer which this indicator may be a proxy for.
Future directions
This indicator is fundamentally related to the annual derivation of 
the relationship between GDP and child mortality. If the relation-
Health is one the main forms of human capital that are 
passed on between generations and child mortality is 
used here as an indicator of the health component of 
the next generation’s human capital.
Table 9: Equation, definition and data source for child mortality 
 indicator
Figure 12: Log­log relationship between child mortality and GDP/c 
in 2012, with regression best fit: r2=0.70 p<0.01, y = 30482x­0.79
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ship between these variables becomes less significant or precise, 
then the indicator method should be changed to reflect this.
Results
Map of results
Distribution of countries
The full table of results for the index can be seen in Online Appen-
dix II (see igjr.org). In total, 120 countries covering 92.4% of the 
world’s population were included. Most countries were in the mid-
dle of the range, with the median being 42 and the mean being 40. 
Norway was the best performing country by some way (78 vs. 70 
for the next highest, Costa Rica), and Mongolia took bottom place 
with 10. Table 10 shows some cultural divisions of particular note.
Within these groups, there are some outliers of note. In the 
OECD, Turkey, Greece and Portugal are on 32 and 33, while the 
USA does only marginally better on 40. In Latin America, Nica-
ragua trails on 24, behind next-placed Paraguay on 36, but Costa 
Rica comes second in the world on 70, 10 points ahead of Peru.
It is important to note that these categories exclude countries with 
insufficient data. These tended to be very small countries, those 
below the Sahara, and those in the Middle East.
Discussion
How useful is the index?
After compiling an index, it is important to sense-check it. Does 
it say anything useful? Does it react well to different data inputs? 
This section summarises some of the indications that it works well.
Geometric aggregation
The use of geometric aggregation has allowed the index to react 
well to extremes of poor performance, even in only one dimension. 
For example, regarding low performance in one field, Paraguay has 
middling economic and slightly below-average social components, 
and its carbon footprint and renewable energy use are among the 
best in the world. However, given it has the worst forest degrada-
tion rate in the world (an astonishing 16.8%), its final score of 32 
is much lower than it might otherwise be – if it had even the same 
degradation rate as Brazil, its final score would have jumped to 50.
Correlations
All indicators except wealth inequality correlated with the final out-
come (see supplementary material online at igjr.org). The standard 
deviation for wealth inequality was low (10.9) even after a square 
transformation, which is likely to be one reason for this. This does 
not necessarily suggest that it should be excluded, given that it did 
change countries’ relative scores with each other. Indeed, it may 
come to be of more discriminative use in the future as wealth ine-
quality in many countries is rising (Stierli et al. 2014).
Carbon footprint correlates negatively, but this is mostly driven 
by poor, low-footprint countries and it affects the rankings of bet-
ter-scoring countries in a highly heterogeneous way. It is worth 
noting that five of the top 10 scoring countries had footprints of 
0.8 Gha/c or below.
Differentiation
One of features of a good index is that it is interesting, i.e. it 
differentiates superficially similar countries and provides a good 
explanation for that. For example, it may be surprising that the 
USA’s score of 40 is so low compared to similar countries in the 
OECD (Table 10); however, this can be traced partly to high in-
equality and carbon footprints, low savings rates and very poor 
child mortality given its GDP per capita. Thus, the USA can be 
said to generally act less in the interests of future generations than 
other similar countries, something that is not necessarily apparent 
from individual indicators.
Another example is that despite their generally high scores, the 
three Scandinavian countries are further spread than might be 
expected for such culturally, linguistically and economically ho-
mogenous countries. The root causes can be traced to varying in-
vestments in renewable energy, savings, and differing inequality. 
Interestingly, forest degradation appears highest in Sweden, de-
spite having by far the most forest area per capita. Iceland, which 
shares many cultural features, fares the worst of all Nordic coun-
tries despite very good environmental and social scores. This is 
entirely caused by its recent history of economic mismanagement 
and consequential current account and savings problems.
Patterns of note
High and low performers
The highest scores are generally driven by good performance in all 
of the social indicators, healthy current account balances and high 
One of features of a good index is that it is interesting, 
i.e. it differentiates superficially similar countries and 
provides a good explanation for that. For example, it may 
be surprising that the USA’s score of 40 is so low com-
pared to similar countries in the OECD; however, this can 
be traced partly to high inequality and carbon footprints, 
low savings rates and very poor child mortality given its 
GDP per capita.
Figure 13: Choropleth map of index score
Table 10: Selected mean index scores and ranges of different groups of 
countries. See supplementary material for a list of countries in each 
grouping
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savings (see supplementary material), while environmental indica-
tors are not much above the median aside from low-carbon energy 
generation (+20). Amongst low scorers, the differences seem to be 
driven by forest degradation (the bottom deciles are on average -34 
points from the median), balances of payments (-45 points), pu-
pil-teacher ratios (-45 points), and fertility rates (-31 points).
Cultures and groupings
In dividing up the world into some social and economic group-
ings (Table 10), some patterns can be discerned. Despite the top 10 
containing three post-communist countries, one communist coun-
try (Vietnam; China is 11th) and two Nordic social democracies, 
countries with socialist or communist heritage have a wide range 
of scores and this group also contains the overall lowest country 
(Mongolia). Further research might investigate the particulars of 
the legacy of socialist planning on their levels of intergenerational 
solidarity; it may be that certain countries have retained the kind 
of long-term orientation that supposedly characterised planned 
economies (Ellman 2014). The Nordic social democracies all score 
above average, but the four Confucian nations included do even 
better; some researchers have proposed that long-termism is an 
inherent part of Confucian culture (e.g. Hofstede 1993) and this 
gives some evidence to this suggestion. In an interesting contrast, 
it appears that reference in a nation’s constitution to future gener-
ations is irrelevant to actual actions – these countries perform no 
better than others on average. Also, the large oil incomes that fund 
some nations’ sovereign wealth investment funds – Norway and 
Saudi Arabia, for instance – do not appear to have a universal effect 
on intergenerational solidarity, with the average score of major oil 
producers similar to the average of all countries.
Correlates
There are some interesting relationships with national variables of 
population density, population and GDP (PPP) per capita19. It 
seems that there is relatively little relationship with density or popu-
lation, thus casting doubt on the idea that intergenerational solidar-
ity may be something that is particularly easy for sparsely-populated 
or small countries. However, despite attempting to measure propor-
tionality and thus expressing a preference for indicators that were 
not purely proxies for income, GDP/c does have a large and signifi-
cant relationship with several indicators and a medium relationship 
with the overall index. There may also be a causative relationship 
in either direction, i.e. that rich countries can give proportionally 
more to future generations or that long-termist countries end up 
with higher incomes. Rawls suggests that this is the case: 
“When people are poor and saving is difficult, a lower rate of saving 
should be required; whereas in a wealthier society greater savings 
may reasonably be expected since the real burden of saving is less.”
(Rawls 1999: 255)
However, the correlation does only predict 22% of variance and 
there are many outliers; it is quite likely that much of the effect 
comes from the generally poor performance of Sub-Saharan Af-
rican countries suffering from well-documented complexes of so-
cioeconomic and institutional problems. It should also be noted 
that within the top decile of nations, there is a very wide range of 
per-capita income, from $694 in Nepal and $3279 in Sri Lanka 
to over $100,000 in Norway.
Suggestions for refinements and future research
Rawls asserts
“Each passes on to the next a fair equivalent in real capital as de­
fined by a just savings principle… capital is not only factories and 
machines, and so on, but also the knowledge and culture, as well 
as the techniques and skills, that make possible just institutions 
and the fair value of liberty.” (Rawls 1999: 256)
This index could not capture the kinds of capital he mentions, 
except through a measure of each nation’s investment in primary 
education. Further consideration should be given to these as the 
coverage and quality of measurement of social capital improves. 
As datasets become available, indicators from other dimensions 
should be added to the index, whilst retaining the ratio between 
different dimensions. Of those mentioned in Online Appendix I 
(see igjr.org), the social discount rate should be one of the main 
priorities for further research. Theory-based predictors of personal 
discount rates should also receive attention.
Weighting is an area of contention in index-building. While this 
index has a priori equal weighting, a posteriori contributions from 
each indicator could be calibrated through the use of structural 
equation modelling or similar, although dimensions should remain 
equally-weighted. Also, more GDP-corrections might be consid-
ered for a number of the indicators; as this index is conceived as 
a comparative tool between cultures rather than a direct measure, 
this would help adjust for ability to give. Poor nations that give 
more than would be expected to their future generations are at least 
as important to study as those more able to give, if not more so.
Further editions of the index might also take into account 
cross-cultural surveys about our attitudes and behaviour towards 
the future, for example the Consideration of Future Consequenc-
es Scale (Strathman et al. 1994) or the Zimbardo Time Perspec-
tive Inventory (Zimbardo/Boyd 1999). An interesting project in 
itself would be to see if future orientation by either of these meas-
ures correlates with the results of this index. Similarly interesting 
would be further research into the reasons for high index scores, 
particularly as to whether “Confucianism” can really explain why 
Korea, Japan, China and Vietnam score so highly.
Greater statistical analysis (e.g. factor analysis, sensitivity analysis) 
could be performed on the index in order to better select variables 
and in particular to adjust the transformations and processing of 
indicator data to ensure equal weighting. It would be of benefit 
to do this after review from academics in relevant fields, to better 
determine subjective impressions of the indicator results. In the 
first iterations of the index, equal weighting is justified by a lack of 
The Nordic social democracies all score above average, 
but the four Confucian nations included do even better; 
some researchers have proposed that long-termism is an 
inherent part of Confucian culture (e.g. Hofstede 1993) 
and this gives some evidence to this suggestion.
It appears that reference in a nation’s constitution to 
future generations is irrelevant to actual actions – these 
countries perform no better than others on average.
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information, but as we better define the constituents of intergen-
erational solidarity and assess the ability of indicators to measure 
this, weighting may be used.
Lastly, the index could be calculated regularly to give time-series 
data. Historical data are also available for all indicators except 
pupil-teacher ratio and forest degradation, but each year back in 
time includes fewer countries. It seems promising that both of 
these factors will be measured with greater accuracy in the future.
Conclusion
This index is a coherent attempt to construct a theory-based 
multi dimensional composite measure of intergenerational soli-
darity, the yardstick for intergenerational justice. As a starting 
point, it is still far from being precise or accurate, but in this 
regard it suffers from the same limitations as all composite indexes, 
and accounts for many of the problems in others.
Despite its limitations, the usefulness of a composite figure is 
shown in revealing interesting patterns of nations, for example that 
high income does not necessarily guarantee proportionally high 
levels of intergenerational solidarity, that constitutional reference 
to future generations is largely irrelevant to action in their interests, 
and that countries with a Confucian heritage do seem to act more 
in the interests of future generations. Where it may be most useful 
is in the decomposition of national scores to look for plausible 
reasons behind a lack of intergenerational solidarity. As it stands, 
this index can assist further research into the causes of intergener-
ational solidarity and lends itself to refinement by other scholars.
The task of understanding and prioritising intergenerational soli-
darity may seem daunting, but we live in a world that is testament 
to the long-term plans and actions of our ancestors. This index 
was conceived in an oak-coppice forest in Wales where cover trees 
have been planted in 150 year rotations for at least the last mil-
lennium. If medieval charcoal-burners and foresters – some of the 
poorest classes of their time – were able to be so magnanimous, 
then there is hope for the societies of our own time.
Notes
1 I would like to thank Brynhildur Daviðsdóttir and Þröstur Þor-
steinsson for their comments on an earlier version of this paper, 
and Beth Stratford and Bec Sanderson for their intellectual sol-
idarity. I would also like to thank the forestry workers of Cop-
picewood College in Wales for keeping our heritage of intergen-
erational solidarity alive and, in doing so, inspiring this project.
2 This is used throughout as “>50 years” following the definition 
of “intergenerational discounting” set out by Moore et al. (2004).
3 See section “Conceptional framework” for a definition.
4 “Discounting the future” refers to the extent to which we prefer 
present over future value. The “discount rate” is an economic term 
used to define the net present value of future stocks and flows 
of capital. It has a vital role in determining investment in future 
generations, but see section “Economic Indicators”.
5 This conceptualisation is close to “sustainable development”, 
i.e. “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development 
1987: 41). However, Stiglitz et al. note (2009: 72) that measures 
of sustainable development often “effectively conflate the meas-
urement of current wellbeing and the measurement of its sustain-
ability”. This index is focused only on the future, specifically on 
investments in future wellbeing (i.e. beyond basic needs). This 
is meant to encompass all parts of society, not just government 
investments. 
6 And sometimes explicit – more than 40 nations reference obli-
gations to future generations in their constitutions (Boyd 2011: 
311).
7 As with the “strong” version of the sustainability concept.
8 This is not to say that they are vague, however – for example, the 
capacity of societies to transform might be related to evidence-based 
policy decisions, capture of government by special interests, path 
dependency in infrastructure choice etc. Aggregating this would 
clearly be difficult, but the area deserves qualitative commentary.
9 see Online Appendix I (see igjr.org).
10 All null values were aggregated using a value of 1, as is neces-
sary for geometric aggregation to function.
11 Equations are unsimplified for explanatory clarity. Here, -10 is 
the scale minimum, and 0 is the maximum.
12 Assuming e.g. a linear relationship between GDP and carbon 
footprint.
13 For Malawi, Uganda, Madagascar, Laos, Paraguay, Niger, Bur-
kina Faso, Mali, Rwanda, Guinea, Burundi, Liberia.
14 Some classic examples of national economic crises predicted 
by a large current account deficit are: the 1991 Indian crisis; the 
1997 Asian crisis (Radelet/Sachs 1998); the 2008 Icelandic cri-
sis (Obstfeld 2012); the 1999-2002 Argentinian crisis (Bussière 
2007); the 1994 Mexican crisis (Blecker/Ibarra 2013); and argua-
bly the ongoing crisis in much of the Eurozone (Krugman 2014), 
or even the 2008 global financial crisis (Corden 2011).
15 There is considerable discussion of the relationship between 
current account deficits and post-2008 GDP, e.g. see Backus et 
al. (2005); Blanchard (2007); Blanchard/Milesi-Ferretti (2012); 
Brissimis et al. (2012); Herwartz/Siedenburg (2007); Milesi-Fer-
retti et al. (1996); Radelet/Sachs (1998).
16 Vemuri and Costanza (2006) could find no measure of social 
capital that adequately related even to current wellbeing, and 
Glaeser et al. (2004) found no necessary relationship between in-
stitutional quality (a common measure of social capital), growth 
and poverty-reduction, and considered most measures of institu-
tional quality to be “conceptually unsuitable” for measuring what 
they purported.
17 It is common for indicators of educational capital in composite 
indexes to use spending on education or years of schooling as an 
indicator. However, years of primary schooling do not vary mean-
ingfully outside of the least developed countries, and the number 
of teaching staff probably has a closer relationship with education 
outcomes than spending more generally (Glewwe et al. 2013).
18 i.e. impact is a function of population, affluence and technology.
19 See supplementary material.
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Online Appendix 
 
Appendix I – Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean of top 
decile 
Mean Median Mean of bottom 
decile 
Range 
Forest Degradation 81 72 76 41 100 
Carbon Footprint 60 67 75 81 93 
Low-Carbon Energy 43 28 25 19 100 
Environmental Average 55 43 44 31 85 
Wealth Inequality 52 47 49 54 64 
Current Account 90 64 74 26 100 
Adjusted Net Savings 69 42 34 14 100 
Economic Average 67 42 45 18 79 
Pupil-Teacher Ratio 81 62 74 25 100 
Child Mortality 86 57 66 32 100 
Fertility Rate 82 57 64 29 91 
Social Average 83 52 57 15 94 
Index 67 40 41 13 68 
Descriptive statistics of indicators and index. Deciles are determined based on final index score, not 
indicator score 
 
 Mean Range 
Countries with constitutional reference to future generations: 
Uganda; Burundi; Malawi; Jamaica; Qatar; Zambia; Ghana; South 
Africa; Portugal; Lesotho; Kenya; Albania; Armenia; Argentina; Bolivia; 
Poland; Morocco; Namibia; Brazil; Ecuador; Russian Federation; Czech 
Republic; Venezuela; Switzerland; France; Germany; Tajikistan; 
Sweden; Norway1 
42 65 
Communist/Post-Communist: Azerbaijan; Lithuania; Vietnam; 
Tajikistan; Latvia; China; Russian Federation; Estonia; Ukraine; 
Armenia; Kyrgyz Republic; Belarus; Kazakhstan; Mongolia; Poland; 
Slovakia; Romania; Bulgaria; Hungary; Czech Republic; Albania; 
Macedonia; Croatia; Slovenia, Lao, Cambodia 
47 58 
Nordic Countries: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Iceland 61 28 
Anglosphere: UK; USA; New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Ireland 53 24 
Latin America: Costa Rica; Venezuela, RB; Peru; Ecuador; Brazil; 
Uruguay; Bolivia; Colombia; Argentina; Chile; Panamas; Paraguay; 
Nicaragua 
47 46 
Sub-Sahara: Mauritius; Kenya; Namibia; Senegal; Burkina Faso; 
Rwanda; Ethiopia; Congo, Dem. Rep.; Lesotho; Togo; Nigeria; Liberia; 
21 24 
2 
Botswana; South Africa; Ghana; Sudan; Cameroon; Tanzania; Cote 
d'Ivoire; Malawi; Guinea; Zambia; Angola; Benin; Mali; Burundi; 
Niger; Uganda; Sierra Leone; Mozambique; Guinea-Bissau 
Oil-Producers2: Norway; Azerbaijan; Venezuela; Canada; Russian 
Federation; Denmark; Ecuador; Mexico; Australia; Algeria; Malaysia; 
Colombia; Nigeria; USA; Kazkhstan; Saudi Arabia; Angola; Kuwait 
39 63 
OECD: USA; Greece; Portugal; Chile; Israel; Poland; Turkey; 
Australia; Mexico; Slovakia; Estonia; Netherlands; Ireland; Spain; South 
Korea; Denmark; Italy; United Kingdom; Canada; Czech Republic; 
Japan; Switzerland; New Zealand; France; Austria; Finland; Germany; 
Belgium; Hungary; Slovenia; Norway; Iceland 
54 46 
Confucian: Vietnam; China; Japan; South Korea 63 11 
Selected mean index scores and ranges of different groups of countries 
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Forest 1 -.229* -0.069 .201* 0.003 0.016 0.068 0.111 .236* 0.075 .212* .204* .263** 
Footprint -.229* 1 0.02 .421** 0.173 -.434** -.220* -.375** -.781** -0.164 -.574** -.516** -.282** 
Energy -0.069 0.02 1 .747** 0.01 -0.037 -0.086 -0.054 0.075 .187* 0.152 .207* .433** 
Env. Average .201* .421** .747** 1 0.06 -.201* -0.144 -0.156 -.227* 0.032 -0.034 -0.029 .309** 
Inequality 0.003 0.173 0.01 0.06 1 -.273** -.228* -0.158 -.196* 0.174 -.192* -0.056 -0.141 
BoP 0.016 -.434** -0.037 -.201* -.273** 1 .376** .768** .467** -0.029 .374** .270** .472** 
Savings 0.068 -.220* -0.086 -0.144 -.228* .376** 1 .779** .267** 0.118 .305** .262** .490** 
Econ. Average 0.111 -.375** -0.054 -0.156 -0.158 .768** .779** 1 .426** 0.098 .406** .342** .645** 
Teachers .236* -.781** 0.075 -.227* -.196* .467** .267** .426** 1 .268** .688** .733** .513** 
Child Mortality 0.075 -0.164 .187* 0.032 0.174 -0.029 0.118 0.098 .268** 1 .275** .711** .466** 
Fertility .212* -.574** 0.152 -0.034 -.192* .374** .305** .406** .688** .275** 1 .725** .588** 
Social Average .204* -.516** .207* -0.029 -0.056 .270** .262** .342** .733** .711** .725** 1 .724** 
Index Average .263** -.282** .433** .309** -0.141 .472** .490** .645** .513** .466** .588** .724** 1 
Population 0.026 .185* -0.023 0.102 -.190* 0.135 0.048 0.122 -.233* -0.113 -0.119 -.191* 0.114 
GDP/c (2013) .234* -.860** 0.119 -.236** -.314** .552** .274** .471** .864** 0.115 .702** .603** .466** 
Density (2013) 0.142 -0.152 -0.082 -0.032 0.05 0.062 .209* .216* 0.045 .293** 0.108 0.153 0.149 
*p<.05 (two-tailed); **p<.01. 
Bivariate correlations (Spearman’s ρ) of indicators, averages and selected variables 
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Appendix II – Some indicators considered for inclusion 
 
Indicator Source Reason for rejection 
Maternity leave laws3 ILO 
Despite being used elsewhere, there is little 
evidence linking this to the wellbeing of children, 
as opposed to parents. 
Education spend (%GDP/c) 
per primary student UNESCO Not enough data points 
School Attendance UNESCO 
Not enough differentiation in rich countries; 
statistics heavily skewed by repeat years, late entry 
etc. 
Life Expectancy World Bank 
Not enough differentiation in rich countries; 
theoretically lacking as it describes current human 
capital rather than the next generation’s. 
Funding for health care as % 
of GDP/c Various 
Lack of centralised data on public/private spending 
splits; theoretically may relate exclusively to 
disproportionate investment in current generations 
e.g. healthcare for the elderly 
State spending on the old vs. 
the young4 Various 
Not enough data; may relate more to differences in 
pension funding mechanisms 
Deforestation rate FAO Unreliable; superseded by satellite data 
Consumption CO2 per capita Footprint of 
Nations 
Not enough data points 
Gross Capital formation World Bank Not as precise as Adjusted Net Savings 
Gross Savings World Bank Not as precise as Adjusted Net Savings 
Central Government Debt World Bank 
Not an indicator of short-termism (see Economics 
section) and non-comparable between federal and 
non-federal countries 
 
Income Inequality (Gini) World Bank Wealth inequality more relevant 
Research & Development 
Budget World Bank 
Non-comparable data due to differences in 
public/private investment 
Advertising to Children Various Not enough data points 
Social Discount Rate Various Not enough data points 
Personal Discount Rate Various Currently too heterogeneous in measurement5 
Household Debt Various Not enough data points 
4 
Pension spending/deficit by 
central government Various 
Non-comparable data due to differences in 
public/private investment; not enough data points 
United Nations Voluntary 
Contributions (%GDP/c) U.N. 
Inadequate data; U.N. funding is generally 
progressive (even after corrections for GDP) 
Child Wellbeing UNICEF Not enough data points 
Status of tobacco Various Too much variation in policies 
Soil erosion/land degradation FAO 
Not enough time-series data points (1991 only); 
doubts about accuracy; much reflects semi-natural 
change (e.g. desertification) 
 
 
 
Appendix III – Full table of indicator and index scores 
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Norway 82 75 61 72 39 100 88 70 100 83 96 93 78 1 
Costa Rica 68 86 59 70 41 58 75 56 76 91 91 86 70 2 
Vietnam 64 100 21 51 57 100 76 76 73 82 86 80 68 3 
Slovenia 90 23 51 47 71 100 54 73 85 100 82 89 67 4 
Sweden 59 22 67 44 37 100 91 70 100 100 88 96 67 5 
Nepal 96 100 16 54 53 100 100 81 38 88 82 65 66 6 
Lithuania 73 46 43 52 55 100 36 58 91 90 89 90 65 7 
France 86 30 68 56 51 85 46 59 79 92 81 84 65 8 
Hungary 100 43 40 56 58 100 37 60 99 89 61 81 65 9 
Sri Lanka 83 100 20 55 55 58 92 67 66 100 59 73 64 10 
China 75 50 19 42 48 100 100 78 80 77 87 81 64 11 
New Zealand 100 50 54 65 50 70 36 50 86 72 86 81 64 12 
Switzerland 92 18 63 47 36 100 87 68 98 67 74 78 63 13 
Belgium 73 21 46 41 60 93 50 66 97 83 98 92 63 14 
Korea, Rep. 83 22 41 42 45 100 100 77 64 100 57 72 61 15 
Bulgaria 99 40 48 58 56 82 37 55 83 62 76 73 61 16 
Tajikistan  100 76 87 60 60 41 53 68 74 23 49 61 17 
Germany 81 26 36 42 41 100 64 64 92 87 65 80 60 18 
Peru 82 100 32 64 33 74 66 55 72 54 60 61 60 19 
Philippines 81 100 49 74 30 100 100 67 40 50 40 43 60 20 
Finland 54 17 45 34 49 100 52 63 88 100 96 95 59 21 
5 
Spain 90 32 40 49 55 74 34 52 92 91 57 78 58 22 
Croatia 96 35 24 43 56 88 29 52 86 100 75 86 58 23 
Austria 68 21 33 36 39 100 71 65 95 82 68 81 58 24 
Netherlands 83 26 14 31 47 100 66 68 96 76 96 89 57 25 
Latvia 33 55 25 35 54 100 56 67 95 72 68 78 57 26 
Japan 94 25 38 45 60 100 21 50 79 100 69 82 57 27 
Uruguay 100 86 38 69 40 66 18 36 81 60 81 73 57 28 
Ireland 100 19 15 30 49 100 60 67 83 83 83 83 55 29 
El Salvador 50 100 58 66 47 59 34 45 29 81 73 56 55 30 
Czech Republic 90 23 41 44 40 77 28 45 81 100 72 83 55 31 
United Kingdom 89 25 30 40 53 72 26 46 81 77 90 82 54 32 
Romania 90 60 34 57 46 63 25 41 83 45 74 65 54 33 
Italy 94 29 24 40 56 85 18 44 99 97 66 85 53 34 
Ecuador 78 100 27 59 43 92 32 51 73 33 55 51 53 35 
Brazil 52 100 39 59 32 76 23 38 70 46 92 67 53 36 
Denmark 66 30 19 34 21 100 58 49 98 88 82 89 53 37 
Thailand 75 75 8 35 32 100 70 61 83 64 64 70 53 38 
Canada 63 18 47 38 47 68 41 51 85 66 76 75 52 39 
Venezuela, RB 83 43 32 49 33 100 54 56 78 29 61 52 52 40 
Macedonia, FYR 75 30 21 36 52 68 31 48 80 97 67 81 52 41 
Estonia 48 35 6 22 53 100 66 71 96 100 70 88 51 42 
Malaysia 28 55 9 24 35 100 85 67 87 77 90 84 51 43 
Australia 100 25 12 31 59 60 36 51 86 79 88 84 51 44 
Indonesia 45 100 28 51 29 94 100 65 79 12 65 40 51 45 
Russian Federation 84 25 29 39 20 100 51 46 81 42 86 66 49 46 
Iceland  75 91 82 53 82 0 16 100 100 72 90 49 47 
Ukraine 82 50 43 56 16 45 22 25 83 100 69 83 49 48 
Mexico 68 32 25 38 42 88 51 57 55 36 74 52 48 49 
Bangladesh 72 100 5 32 54 100 100 81 14 70 80 42 48 50 
Poland 95 32 6 26 44 62 45 50 99 98 64 85 48 51 
Israel  26 21 24 40 100 70 65 92 98 36 69 47 52 
Slovak Republic 70 33 50 49 80 90 4 30 84 68 66 72 47 53 
Morocco 100 100 11 48 38 29 100 48 58 32 40 42 46 54 
Colombia 76 100 35 65 41 72 5 25 55 52 67 57 45 55 
Armenia 98 100 56 82 59 0 38 13 75 84 92 83 45 56 
Argentina 10 86 25 27 35 100 30 47 84 44 72 64 44 57 
Cyprus 84 26 16 33 35 35 17 28 86 100 69 84 42 58 
Chile 100 100 25 63 38 91 0 15 62 80 97 78 42 59 
Bolivia 54 100 18 46 44 100 20 45 65 18 36 35 41 60 
Azerbaijan 96 86 14 48 58 100 57 69 94 0 95 21 41 61 
United States 59 14 34 30 28 72 29 39 90 20 91 55 40 62 
Tunisia 100 100 4 33 45 37 12 27 79 62 64 68 39 63 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  100 13 37 35 78 18 37 62 30 46 44 39 64 
Albania 64 100 45 66 55 0 26 11 75 72 92 79 39 65 
Kyrgyz Republic 97 100 60 83 58 0 25 11 64 95 29 56 38 66 
Paraguay 0 100 100 22 43 100 18 43 60 62 44 55 37 67 
Haiti 73 100 7 38 41 61 68 55 10 39 35 24 37 68 
Panama 59 60 32 48 39 5 100 27 65 14 58 37 36 69 
6 
Mauritius 100 43 29 50 45 3 31 15 71 44 61 57 35 70 
Kenya 61 100 27 55 50 30 33 37 16 20 20 19 34 71 
India 84 100 16 51 34 68 95 60 29 0 62 12 33 72 
Portugal 45 32 27 34 50 42 0 13 97 100 64 85 33 73 
Pakistan 89 100 20 56 61 86 48 63 27 0 41 10 33 74 
Senegal  100 8 28 55 36 45 45 32 52 15 29 33 75 
Jordan  75 13 31 56 4 54 24 75 40 34 47 33 76 
Greece 72 27 17 32 54 34 0 12 97 96 70 87 32 77 
Namibia  100 29 54 31 64 65 51 45 0 41 12 32 78 
Turkey 93 55 24 49 29 36 40 35 75 0 84 18 32 79 
Algeria 76 100 3 27 54 100 100 82 64 0 40 14 31 80 
Belarus 97 35 1 16 58 1 96 18 86 100 93 93 29 81 
Burkina Faso  100 21 46 55 67 34 50 4 28 13 11 29 82 
Rwanda 90 100 27 62 48 19 30 30 0 88 19 12 28 83 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 76 100 17 51 53 32 0 12 32 73 12 31 26 84 
Ethiopia 84 100 11 45 61 56 11 34 0 86 20 12 26 85 
Lao PDR 57 100 93 81 59 78 0 17 51 0 44 13 26 86 
Togo 78 100 6 35 57 41 0 13 27 62 18 31 24 87 
Lesotho  100 74 86 46 0 73 15 30 0 45 11 24 88 
Bahrain  11 0 3 56 100 58 69 95 32 83 63 24 89 
Nicaragua 0 100 32 15 49 0 66 15 44 86 58 60 24 90 
Jamaica 66 75 7 33 41 0 28 6 60 70 69 66 23 91 
Singapore  14 0 2 48 100 100 78 77 85 57 72 23 92 
Nigeria 79 100 7 37 36 100 24 44 27 0 11 7 22 93 
Liberia 69 100 0 19 57 0 31 12 58 100 17 46 22 94 
Lebanon 98 38 11 34 26 0 0 3 89 76 69 77 20 95 
Botswana  60 0 8 37 81 100 67 61 0 55 15 20 96 
South Africa 100 38 16 39 33 61 1 14 47 0 63 14 20 97 
Ghana 52 100 24 50 55 5 12 15 44 0 27 11 20 98 
Sudan  100 14 37 59 39 4 20 42 0 21 10 19 99 
Cameroon 89 100 23 59 54 63 4 24 6 0 18 5 19 100 
Cote d'Ivoire 8 100 12 21 48 100 22 47 16 0 16 6 19 101 
Malawi 21 100 71 53 55 0 21 11 0 99 13 11 18 102 
Kazakhstan 98 22 10 28 24 100 0 13 83 0 50 16 18 103 
Tanzania 60 100 11 40 58 0 67 16 0 60 13 9 18 104 
Guinea 64 100 46 66 56 0 0 4 14 46 17 23 18 105 
Saudi Arabia  25 0 5 40 100 66 64 97 0 53 17 18 106 
Angola 76 100 15 49 43 100 0 16 17 0 14 6 17 107 
Qatar  8 0 3 47 100 100 78 97 0 91 21 17 108 
Benin  100 0 10 56 18 23 28 6 37 17 16 16 109 
Mali  100 51 71 56 13 21 25 0 0 9 2 15 110 
Cambodia 0 100 3 7 55 42 17 34 0 76 45 15 15 111 
Kuwait  8 0 3 44 100 67 67 100 0 49 17 15 112 
Trinidad & Tobago 65 9 0 8 49 100 0 17 82 0 95 20 14 113 
Burundi 72 100 51 72 59 0 0 4 0 92 11 10 14 114 
Niger  100 0 10 56 0 31 12 24 64 7 22 14 115 
Uganda 36 100 51 57 53 2 0 4 1 63 11 9 13 116 
Sierra Leone 66 100 29 58 56 0 0 4 45 0 22 10 13 117 
7 
Mozambique 35 100 38 51 51 0 0 4 0 73 15 10 12 118 
Guinea-Bissau 58 100 0 18 59 40 0 13 0 11 18 6 11 119 
Mongolia 0 50 0 4 59 0 8 8 47 18 54 36 10 120 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 Boyd (2011): 311. 
2 >1000 litres per capita per year; CIA (2012). 
3 After Kasser (2011). 
4 After Vanhuysse (2013). 
5 Havranek et al. (2015). 
